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WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS: EMPIRICAL DOUBT,
LEGAL AMBIGUITY, AND CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION
CAMILA STRASSLE* & BENJAMIN E. BERKMAN**
ABSTRACT
Federal laws that protect workers from insurance discrimination
and infringement of health privacy include exceptions for wellness
programs that are “voluntary” and “reasonably designed” to improve
health. Initially, these exceptions were intended to give employers the
flexibility to create innovative wellness programs that would appeal
to workers, increase productivity, and protect the workforce from pre-
ventable health conditions.
Yet a detailed look at the scientific literature reveals that wellness
program efficacy is quite disputed, and even highly touted examples
of program success have been shown to be unreliable. Meanwhile, the
latest administrative regulations on wellness programs were vacated
by a district court in January 2019, leaving the legal scope of well-
ness programs in flux. The U.S. District Court of Connecticut now
has a case before it that could start a national overhaul of these
programs.
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In this Article, we give a scientific and legal overview of wellness
programs and explain why wellness programs are a source of ethical
controversy. Given the unsteady evidence on wellness programs’ ben-
efits and their real potential risks, we argue that more should be
done to regulate their scope and design. A robust interpretation of the
relevant statutes would help protect workers in the face of indecisive
evidence. To this end, we conclude with an attempt to resolve the
widespread disagreement over the terms “voluntary” and “reasonable
design” with the goal of providing courts and regulators with a more
workable framework to apply.
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INTRODUCTION
Sustained growth in healthcare spending has prompted employ-
ers to seek options for reducing their overall medical costs.1 One
widespread approach has been to invest in workplace wellness pro-
grams, which incentivize workers to identify health issues and take
steps to improve their well-being.2 The underlying logic of these
programs is that employers can mitigate total insurance costs by
promoting employee health.3 As such, wellness programs typically
encourage workers to stop smoking, join a gym, lose weight, or get
preventive health screenings in order to make them healthier and
more productive.4 These programs are now available to over sixty
million U.S. employees, and the revenue of the wellness industry
has more than quadrupled to eight billion dollars since 2011.5 A
handful of states have also started expanding wellness programs
into Medicaid.6 In short, the programs are a highly complex and en-
trenched feature of U.S. employment.
Policymakers have frequently assumed that the benefits of such
programs are self-evident; intuitively, investing in employee health
seems good for employees.7 However, a thorough look at the
1. Alden J. Bianchi, The Emerging Contours of the Rules Governing Wellness Programs,
PRAC. LAW., Aug. 2017, at 43; see also Damon Jones et al., What Do Workplace Wellness
Programs Do? Evidence from the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1747, 1748
(2019).
2. Bianchi, supra note 1, at 43.
3. See E. Pierce Blue, Wellness Programs, the ADA, and GINA: Framing the Conflict, 31
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 367-68 (2014).
4. See id. at 369.
5. KAREN POLLITZ & MATTHEW RAE, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WORKPLACE WELLNESS
PROGRAMS CHARACTERISTICS AND REQUIREMENTS 5-7 (2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/
Issue-Brief-Workplace-Wellness-Programs-Characteristics-and-Requirements [https://perma.
cc/AG3B-JJVW].
6. See Karen J. Blumenthal et al., Medicaid Incentive Programs to Encourage Healthy
Behavior Show Mixed Results to Date and Should Be Studied and Improved, 32 HEALTH AFF.
497, 497, 500-01 (2013) (describing ten states’ existing Medicaid incentive programs that were
funded by a $85 million grant through the Affordable Care Act); see also Natoshia M. Askelson
et al., Iowa’s Medicaid Expansion Promoted Healthy Behaviors but Was Challenging to
Implement and Attracted Few Participants, 36 HEALTH AFF. 799, 799-800 (2017) (evaluating
Iowa’s Healthy Behaviors Program which incentivized members to complete healthy activities
in return for waiving monthly premiums).
7. See, e.g., Alexandra Black, Five Reasons Employee Wellness Is Worth the Investment,
HEALTH.GOV (May 17, 2017), https://health.gov/news/blog/2017/05/five-reasons-employee-
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scientific literature on wellness programs supports a more skeptical
view. Specifically, the presumption that programs benefit health or
influence costs is far from substantiated by the literature.8 Mean-
while, these programs have come under scrutiny, and some have
raised doubts about whether the programs harm participants.9
Given the lack of conclusive data on wellness programs’ benefits and
harms, one would expect such programs to be subject to significant
regulatory oversight in order to protect program participants.
Yet the laws governing wellness programs are currently precari-
ous. Typically, federal statutes prohibit employers from soliciting
employees’ health information or varying their insurance benefits
based on health status.10 However, these statutes make exceptions
for wellness programs that are “voluntary” for participants and
“reasonably designed” to improve health, and what these regulatory
standards mean in practice remains unclear.11 Administrative
agencies have issued conflicting guidance, and district courts have
disagreed about what features make a program voluntary.12
Effective January 2019, a D.C. federal judge struck down the latest
regulatory attempt at defining what constitutes a voluntary pro-
gram, and no new regulations have been proposed.13 As a result, the
legal scope of wellness programs is in flux, signaling a need for
better guidance.
Now the U.S. District Court of Connecticut has a case before it
that could start dismantling these programs. In July 2019, Yale
employees filed a complaint stating that the university’s wellness
program is not voluntary.14 The outcome of this case could set an im-
portant precedent for how wellness programs will be implemented
wellness-is-worth-the-investment/ [https://perma.cc/X4RY-DH74].
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See, e.g., Lena Solow, The Scourge of Worker Wellness Programs, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept.
2, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154890/scourge-worker-wellness-programs [https://
perma.cc/3P4Y-E2R8].
10. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 195, 198-99 (2014).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2012); see Katie Keith, HHS Proposes New Wellness
Demonstration Projects, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20191001.231439/full/ [https://perma.cc/WW5W-MLXV].
12. See infra Parts III.A.3, III.B.
13. See AARP v. EEOC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238, 245 (D.D.C. 2017).
14. Complaint at 3, Kwesell v. Yale Univ., No. 3:19-cv-1098 (D. Conn. July 16, 2019).
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in the future as well as affect how voluntariness will be conceptual-
ized in the law more broadly.
This Article synthesizes the empirical, legal, and policy litera-
tures on workplace wellness programs. In Parts I and II, we will
provide an extended analysis of programs’ potential benefits and
risks, arguing that wellness programs do not necessarily have a
favorable effect. A detailed view of the scientific literature on
wellness programs indicates that program efficacy is quite disputed.
We will argue that it is no longer appropriate to assume that
individual programs are “reasonably designed” to positively affect
health, suggesting that employers should have to meet a higher
evidentiary burden to establish the programs’ effectiveness. Our
goal in these Parts is to push back against the original policy ap-
proach that crafted easily satisfied regulatory requirements because
programs appeared to be clearly beneficial. Given our argument that
the regulatory approach is inadequate, we then turn in Part III to
the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions relevant to the
regulation of wellness programs in order to assess whether there is
an opportunity to pivot towards more rigorous oversight. We argue
that voluntariness and reasonable design are frequently interpreted
loosely and applied inconsistently, but that these standards can be
strengthened. To that end, Part IV provides a conceptual analysis
of the factors that would render a program voluntary and reason-
ably designed. Our analysis is framed to help guide the implementa-
tion of wellness programs while avoiding some of their potential
pitfalls.
I. THE DUBIOUS EVIDENCE ON PROGRAM BENEFITS
A. Early Enthusiasm
Broad initial support for wellness programs was based on em-
pirical literature that pointed to wellness as a promising avenue for
influencing health and healthcare costs. Several well-publicized case
studies of Johnson & Johnson (1986), Bank of America (1993), the
California Public Employees Retirement System (1994), and
Citibank Health Management Program (1999) demonstrated sizable
2020] WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS 1669
healthcare savings by implementing programs.15 In 2009, Safeway
reported that its program had saved the company approximately 40
percent in medical expenses.16 A high-profile meta-analysis pub-
lished in 2010 found that for every dollar spent on a program,
medical costs fell by about $3.27 and absenteeism costs fell by about
$2.73.17 These findings and others occasioned sustained interest in
wellness programs.18
In addition to empirical and anecdotal support, encouraging such
programs had extensive, bipartisan political appeal. President
Obama, for example, highlighted wellness as a central tenet of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA):
Our federal government also has to step up its efforts to advance
the cause of healthy living. Five of the costliest illnesses and
conditions—cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, lung dis-
ease, and strokes—can be prevented. And yet only a fraction of
every health care dollar goes to prevention or public health. That
is starting to change with an investment we are making in
prevention and wellness programs that can help us avoid
diseases that harm our health and the health of our economy.19
15. See Janet L. Bly et al., Impact of Worksite Health Promotion on Health Care Costs and
Utilization, 256 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3235, 3237-40 (1986); James F. Fries et al., Randomized
Controlled Trial of Cost Reductions from a Health Education Program: The California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) Study, 8 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 216, 217, 222
(1994); James F. Fries et al., Two-Year Results of a Randomized Controlled Trial of a Health
Promotion Program in a Retiree Population: The Bank of America Study, 94 AM. J. MED. 455,
455, 460-61 (1993); Ronald J. Ozminkowski et al., A Return on Investment Evaluation of the
Citibank, N.A., Health Management Program, 14 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 31, 32-39 (1999).
16. Steven A. Burd, How Safeway Is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J., June 12,
2009, at A15.
17. Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29
HEALTH AFF. 304, 308 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Leonard L. Berry et al., What’s the Hard Return on Employee Wellness
Programs?, 88 HARV. BUS. REV. 104, 105 (2010) (citing Johnson & Johnson’s program to con-
clude “U.S. companies can use wellness programs to chip away at their enormous health care
costs”).
19. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address to the American Medical Association on
Health Care Reform (June 15, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/health/policy/
15obama.text.html [https://perma.cc/3T5X-6TCR]; see Howard K. Koh & Kathleen G. Sebelius,
Promoting Prevention Through the Affordable Care Act, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1296, 1297
(2010).
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Similarly, excitement about Safeway’s wellness program moti-
vated public comment from Mitch McConnell and John McCain. In
a speech on the Senate floor, Mitch McConnell stated, “The Safeway
program has proven so successful that the company wants to
increase its incentives for rewarding healthy behavior. Unfortu-
nately, current laws restrict it from doing so.”20 A substantive result
was the passage of the ACA’s “Safeway Amendment,” an homage to
Safeway’s program that eased regulatory barriers and authorized
grants for wellness programs.21 In short, the early evidence showed
promise for wellness programs’ ability to achieve health goals,
which prompted policymakers to support their expansion.
B. Reassessing the Evidence
However, the weakness of the evidence supporting wellness
programs has increasingly been recognized, calling into question the
foundation on which these programs are based. In this Section, we
outline the state of understanding about the benefits of these pro-
grams. We show that common problems have been noted throughout
the wellness literature, including self-selection, attrition, small
sample sizes, short measurement periods, inexact case-control
matching, overutilization of self-report measures, and lack of valid
measures, among others. Altogether, these shortcomings call into
doubt the quality of the existing evidence, suggesting a more cir-
cumspect estimation of wellness programs’ benefits.
A close read of the early literature undercuts policymakers’ early
enthusiasm for wellness programs. For example, a 1996 review
summarizing the literature on the health effects of 316 programs
calls attention to several methodological issues that permeate the
wellness literature, namely design, sampling, and instrumenta-
tion.22 The majority of programs used study designs that did not
include a comparison group or randomly assign subjects, raising
20. David S. Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims About Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape
Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2010, at G01.
21. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10408, 124 Stat.
977-78 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280l (2012)).
22. Mark G. Wilson et al., A Comprehensive Review of the Effects of Worksite Health
Promotion on Health-Related Outcomes, 10 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 429, 434 (1996). 
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“concerns about the validity of the findings.”23 In particular, the
studies had high levels of selection bias; the wellness program par-
ticipants differed systematically from nonparticipants, meaning that
the data in the literature probably overstated the programs’ effect.24
Another design issue is that the average duration of the studies was
short, offering little information about the long-term impact of
wellness programs.25 Consequently, how long any program’s benefits
lasted and whether the benefits increased or attenuated over time
was unknown. The short time horizons captured in the data could
have undersold program effects if health improvements took several
years to accrue or, alternatively, could have oversold their effects if
transient health gains lapsed in the long-term. The authors also
observed that many studies used a convenience sample and
described high attrition, which limited the conclusions that could be
generalized to other groups.26 Finally, almost no studies documented
the reliability or validity of the instruments used to measure the
variables of interest, except for those studies relying on biomedical
outcomes such as cholesterol.27
Reviews of the literature on the cost effects of wellness programs
point to many of the same limitations.28 For example, a 2001 review
indicated that of the thirty-two studies that had examined health-
care costs, eleven used comparison groups that were not random-
ized, and seventeen did not use a comparison group at all.29 In
addition, the authors of a 2008 meta-analysis calculated a mean
effect size and confidence interval across studies focusing on
absenteeism; these figures represented the average magnitude of
program effect and the accuracy of that average.30 The effect size
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id.; see, e.g., John Cawley & Joshua A. Price, A Case Study of a Workplace Wellness
Program that Offers Financial Incentives for Weight Loss, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 794, 801 (2013)
(documenting extremely high attrition and low weight loss).
27. See Wilson et al., supra note 22, at 434.
28. See Baicker et al., supra note 17, at 309-10.
29. Steven G. Aldana, Literature Review, Financial Impact of Health Promotion
Programs: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 15 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 296, 316
(2001).
30. Kizzy M. Parks & Lisa A. Steelman, Organizational Wellness Programs: A Meta-
Analysis, 13 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 58, 66 (2008).
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was low to moderate and the confidence interval was wide, cau-
tioning that practitioners should be more conservative in their
expectation of program benefit.31 Overall, these reviews tempered
the high estimates of wellness program impact reflected in individ-
ual studies.
In short, the early evidence regarding wellness program effective-
ness was fragmentary, poorly operationalized, and often obser-
vational, suggesting a surprisingly weak state of the science on
program benefit. While there was some research indicating that
programs may influence health, this relationship was not supported
by a strong, consistent research base.32 As such, initial wellness
program policy was established in an environment of undue con-
fidence about program benefit.
A number of influential cases reinforce this observation that
policymakers got ahead of the science.33 For example, though
Safeway’s spending slowdown was initially ascribed to a wellness
program, it has since become clear that the observed reduction in
medical spending was precipitated instead by changes to Safeway’s
benefit design in 2006.34 This misreading of empirical data had an
outsized effect on public policy, providing the impetus for the
Safeway Amendment.35
Similarly, the wellness paper with the most direct and lasting
policy influence has been interpreted in misleading ways. From a
sample of twenty-two publications, a 2010 review calculated “the
medical costs f[e]ll about $3.27 for every dollar spent on wellness
programs and that absenteeism costs f[e]ll by about $2.73 for every
dollar spent.”36 However, there were important limitations to this
review.37 In general, conducting a credible return on investment
analysis is difficult because of factors such as self-selection,
attrition, changes in employee demographics, benefit plan modifica-
tions, lack of statistical power, and nonnormal distributions of
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Hilzenrath, supra note 20, at G01.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Baicker et al., supra note 17, at 304, 307.
37. See id. at 309.
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data.38 Therefore, such studies might attribute spending reductions
to wellness programs when they are actually driven by other factors,
threatening internal validity. Nevertheless, the review authors did
not weigh sample sizes or adjust their analysis based on the
methodological quality of the studies.39 In addition, there were
concerns about short study duration, self-selection, and positive
result publication bias.40 Finally, studies have since demonstrated
that return on investment analyses for wellness programs have a
propensity to change in relation to methodological quality, whereby
the lowest quality studies estimate the biggest financial returns and
the randomized, controlled trial designs show negative returns.41
Given this context, interpretations of the review’s findings should
have been highly restrained. Yet references to the paper still feature
prominently on wellness program vendor websites, and it has been
cited in the academic literature over 600 times.42 These cases
demonstrate that most of our wellness policies were set with an
unnuanced understanding of the relevant literature and without
adequate scientific justification.
Newer studies further undermine the assumptions that policy-
makers drew from the earlier data. In recent years, a handful of
appropriately designed studies have offered more direct evidence
that these programs have no appreciable effect.43 For example, a
widely publicized 2019 paper found no significant program impact.44
The authors implemented a large-scale randomized, controlled trial,
where eligibility for their program was randomly assigned at the
individual level for 4834 participants.45 The results indicated strong
38. See Ron Z. Goetzel et al., Do Workplace Health Promotion (Wellness) Programs
Work?, 56 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 927, 929 (2014).
39. See Baicker et al., supra note 17, at 308-09.
40. See id. at 309.
41. Siyan Baxter et al., The Relationship Between Return on Investment and Quality of
Study Methodology in Workplace Health Promotion Programs, 28 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION
347, 359 (2014).
42. Al Lewis, The Outcomes, Economics, and Ethics of the Workplace Wellness Industry,
27 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 1, 9 (2017).
43. See, e.g., Baxter et al., supra note 41, at 359; see also Jones et al., supra note 1, at
1748; Soeren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study: Final Report, 3 RAND
HEALTH Q., Summer 2013, at 63 (finding the impact of wellness programs on healthcare cost
and utilization is not statistically significant and impact on health is modest).
44. Jones et al., supra note 1, at 1750.
45. See id. at 1749.
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patterns of self-selection into the program; during the year prior to
program implementation, program participants spent an average of
$1658 less on healthcare and exhibited healthier behaviors than
nonparticipants.46 After program implementation, there was no
causal effect of the program on medical expenditures, health be-
haviors, employee productivity, or self-reported health status.47 The
authors’ confidence intervals ruled out 84 percent of the findings
from 112 prior studies, as well as the results from the 2010 review.48
This gives credence to the idea that the results of the early litera-
ture were a function of improper design and statistical control,
cautioning that programs may not achieve their intended effect.
The analysis we provide above is not meant to be exhaustive;
many other studies match the overall trends we describe.49 After
four decades of research, the scientific base favoring wellness
programs is dubious. Complicating the matter further, wellness
programs may be less effective outside of the research environment,
given the heterogeneity of programs that employers call a workplace
wellness program. Though individual wellness programs could still
be well-formulated or evidence-based, policymakers should have a
much more modest expectation of overall benefit from wellness
programs when crafting a regulatory regime.
46. Id. at 1772.
47. See id. at 1747, 1776.
48. Id. at 1782.
49. See Debra Lerner et al., A Systematic Review of the Evidence Concerning the Economic
Impact of Employee-Focused Health Promotion and Wellness Programs, 55 J. OCCUPATIONAL
& ENVTL. MED. 209, 210 (2013) (concluding that evidence regarding economic impact is limited
and inconsistent); Soeren Mattke et al., A Review of the U.S. Workplace Wellness Market, 2
RAND HEALTH Q., Winter 2013, at 7 (arguing positive results in studies should be interpreted
with caution); Adrianna McIntyre et al., The Dubious Empirical and Legal Foundations of
Workplace Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 59, 68-70 (2017); Karen Chan
Osilla et al., Systematic Review of the Impact of Worksite Wellness Programs, 18 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE e68, e68 (2012) (showing mixed results regarding health impact and in-
sufficient evidence regarding absenteeism, suggesting the validity of findings is reduced by
lack of rigorous evaluation designs, and concluding “the body of publications is in stark
contrast to the widespread use of such programs”); Zirui Song & Katherine Baicker, Effect of
a Workplace Wellness Program on Employee Health and Economic Outcomes: A Randomized
Clinical Trial, 321 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1491, 1491 (2019) (finding that employees exposed to
a wellness program showed statistically significant changes in two self-reported health
behaviors compared to employees who were not exposed, but the wellness program had no
significant effect on twenty-seven self-reported outcomes, ten clinical measures of health,
thirty-eight healthcare spending and utilization measures, or three employment outcomes,
after eighteen months).
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II. INTENSIFYING CONCERNS ABOUT PROGRAM RISKS
As the previous Part established, policymakers should have been
more tentative in anticipating benefit from wellness programs. At
the same time, worries about program risk have intensified. In
general, an intervention’s risks should be justified by its value. As
such, wellness programs must be reasonably expected to improve
health or well-being at a sufficient level to justify any potential
harms. Since questions persist about the probability and magnitude
of wellness programs’ benefits, it may be warranted to reexamine
the appropriate tolerance for potential risks. If it turns out that
programs’ expected benefits are, in fact, low or uncertain, then even
indeterminate risks should give pause, suggesting a need to reduce
the potential risk of harms to participating employees through
policy changes. In this Part, we will show that an emergent lit-
erature implies that the cumulative risks of many programs are not
proportional to their level of benefit. Though this research is still
sparse, it raises some important concerns. Together with the pre-
viously discussed questions about evidence for benefit, these
concerns make a very strong case for a more conservative policy
approach.
A. Risks of Health Screenings
Programs with health screenings have raised worries about data
ownership, security, privacy, and confidentiality.50 The most com-
mon wellness program component is health screenings that identify
medical conditions, evaluate health risks, and measure indicators
such as body mass index. Sixty-two percent of large firms adminis-
ter health risk assessments that collect medical history and health
status, 50 percent administer biometric screenings that collect
health data through a physical exam, 21 percent aggregate informa-
tion from wearable devices such as Apple Watch, and an additional
unknown percentage offer genetic testing.51 Wellness programs also
50. See Elizabeth A. Brown, Workplace Wellness: Social Injustice, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 191, 216-17 (2017).
51. GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2018
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sometimes access employee claims data or medical records data
from health plans.52
In this context, consumer groups have voiced concern about the
confidentiality of electronically stored program records, the re-
identification of anonymized health data, and the use of health
information for commercial purposes outside of the program.53
Scholars have also speculated that program screenings are used to
surface health issues that are expensive or inconsistent with quality
work performance.54 For example, wellness surveys may ask about
mental illness, problems at work, divorce, and future pregnancy
plans.55 This kind of data may help employers understand their
overall health plan costs but be disconnected from specific wellness
interventions. In addition, commentators note that programs often
seek “passive authorization from participants” to acquire their
health information.56 For example, some programs hide waivers of
privacy rights in obscure links, and authorization forms may include
incomplete information about data use and sharing with third-party
vendors.57 In this context, the worry is that employees might com-
plete screenings or disclose health information without sufficient
understanding of how the data could be used.58
B. Risks of Financial Incentives
Programs that offer financial incentives (i.e., financial penalties
and rewards) invoke a separate constellation of risks. Most wellness
programs bolster uptake through the use of positive or negative
incentives, which can include discounts on insurance premiums,
ANNUAL SURVEY 193-200 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-
Benefits-Annual-Survey-2018 [https://perma.cc/5CGU-LY4H].
52. See POLLITZ & RAE, supra note 5, at 3.
53. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 50, at 206-07.
54. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 735,
763-72 (2017).
55. See Kathy L. Hudson & Karen Pollitz, Undermining Genetic Privacy? Employee
Wellness Programs and the Law, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2017); McIntyre et al., supra note
49, at 73.
56. Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 55, at 2.
57. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,143, 31,155 (May 11,
2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1635).
58. See Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 55, at 2.
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waivers of cost-sharing requirements, and surcharges.59 Incentives
are most frequently connected to employee participation and are
dubbed “participatory,”60 though roughly 8 percent of large firms
disperse incentives based on employee health outcomes such as body
mass index.61 For 19 percent of these “health contingent” programs,
financial penalties and rewards have values exceeding $1000 per
year, mostly in the form of lower premiums or cost sharing.62
Commentators suggest that rather than improve health, these
programs might only shift healthcare costs to the sick in a way that
undermines federal protections against health insurance discrimi-
nation.63 They warn that employers may implement programs to
evade prohibitions on cost shifting under federal law or to discour-
age sick workers from participating in their insurance plans.64
Employees who cannot meet wellness goals may be motivated to
seek less expensive health coverage outside of employment.65 Also,
commentators worry that programs could be used to screen for
employees with low medical spending.66 Workers may be more likely
to join or remain at firms that reward them for their healthy habits,
59. See Mattke et al., supra note 43, at 71-72.
60. See id. at 2.
61. CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at 15; KAREN POLLITZ & MATTHEW RAE, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., CHANGING RULES FOR WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
SENSITIVE HEALTH CONDITIONS 2 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Changing-
Rules-for-Workplace-Wellness-Programs [https://perma.cc/L336-XFHM].
62. CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at 193.
63. See, e.g., Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings
Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFF. J. 468, 474 (2013); see also John
Cawley, The Affordable Care Act Permits Greater Financial Rewards for Weight Loss: A Good
Idea in Principle, but Many Practical Concerns Remain, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 810,
810 (2014); Heather Baird, Note, Healthy Compromise: Reconciling Wellness Program
Financial Incentives with Health Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1474, 1484-86 (2013); Stefanie
Brody, Comment, Working Well(ness): The Impact of the ADA Final Rule on Wellness Program
Regulation and a Proposal for a Zero-Incentive Rule, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
209, 234 (2017) (recommending a zero-incentive rule to prevent cost shifting and disability
discrimination).
64. See JULIA JAMES, HEALTH AFF., HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: WORKPLACE WELLNESS
PROGRAMS 5 (2012), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20121204.853334/full/health
policybrief_81.pdf [https://perma.cc/U43W-6LMH]; see also, e.g., Emily Koruda, Note, More
Carrot, Less Stick: Workplace Wellness Programs & the Discriminatory Impact of Financial
and Health-Based Incentives, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 140-41 (2016).
65. See JAMES, supra note 64, at 5.
66. See Julie Appleby, How Well Do Workplace Wellness Programs Work?, NPR (Apr. 16,
2019, 11:31 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/16/713902890/how-well-
do-workplace-wellness-programs-work [https://perma.cc/B8TS-44H9].
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and as a result, wellness programs may encourage recruitment or
retention of healthy workers. In short, commentators caution that
wellness initiatives may help employers with the stability of their
health plans at the expense of certain employees.67
Relatedly, commentators also point out that tying financial
penalties to health status may disproportionately burden people
with disabilities, low-income individuals, and racial minorities,
because these groups are more likely to be affected by the health
conditions that wellness programs target.68 On this line of reason-
ing, wellness programs are manifestly unfair, given that such
conditions result from a complex set of factors that are not always
under an individual’s control.69 The assumption that incentive
programs will lead to health is not always accurate, and it may
undercut social equity by perpetuating existing financial dis-
parities.70 It may also provoke stigma or animus toward unhealthy
individuals.71 Wellness programs may engage in a form of “health-
ism” by situating the management of health issues at the individual
level and implying that individuals are culpable for their own poor
health.72
Other commentators believe that a system of incentives can make
programs functionally involuntary.73 They hold that incentives may
67. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 64, at 5.
68. See, e.g., Jennifer Dianne Thomas, Comment, Mandatory Wellness Programs: A Plan
to Reduce Health Care Costs or a Subterfuge to Discriminate Against Overweight Employees?,
53 HOW. L.J. 513, 515 (2010).
69. See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy May
Undermine Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 101, 101 (2017); see also Carrie
Griffin Basas, What’s Bad About Wellness? What the Disability Rights Perspective Offers About
the Limitations of Wellness, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1035, 1035 (2014); Peter Conrad,
Wellness in the Work Place: Potentials and Pitfalls of Work-Site Health Promotion, 65
MILBANK Q. 255, 265 (1987); Steven C. Sizemore, Comment, A Fatter Butt Equals a Skinnier
Wallet: Why Workplace Wellness Programs Discriminate Against the Obese and Violate Federal
Employment Law, 11 WYO. L. REV. 639, 641, 643-44 (2011).
70. See, e.g., Harald Schmidt et al., Carrots, Sticks, and Health Care Reform—Problems
with Wellness Incentives, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e3(1), e3(1)-e3(3) (2010).
71. See Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of
Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 315-16
(2012).
72. See Kristin M. Madison, The Risks of Using Workplace Wellness Programs to Foster
a Culture of Health, 35 HEALTH AFF. 2068, 2069 (2016); see also Mariner, supra note 71, at
315-16.
73. See, e.g., Michelle R. Seares, Note, Wellness at Work: Reconciling the Affordable Care
Act with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 218, 238 (2016) (arguing
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render not participating in a program unaffordable, giving work-
ers no real choice but to participate.74 Also, other factors, such as re-
taliation or pressure from supervisors, might make employees feel
that programs are compulsory. As a result, employees might be
stymied from fulfilling a preference to decline health screenings or
evade program risks.75 We discuss this issue in more detail below.
C. Additional Risks
Finally, commentators propose that wellness programs poten-
tially cross a line with respect to employers’ relationships toward
their workers.76 They imply that wellness programs consist of
employers policing workers’ health, perhaps contributing to the
creation of an inappropriate work environment.77 Roughly 41
percent of programs include disease management services that issue
treatment plans and educational materials for employees with
chronic illnesses.78 A subset of these also offer positive or negative
incentives based on adherence to medical advice and prescribed
medications.79 As such, there is a worry that wellness programs
involve some of the risks inherent in routine clinical interventions,
and that penalties for medication adherence may run counter to
patients’ rights to refuse any medical treatment.80 Commentators
also suggest that some programs use unreliable measures of health,
financial incentives push the boundary between voluntary and coercive); see also Julia Wolfe,
Note, Coerced into Health: Workplace Wellness Programs and Their Threat to Genetic Privacy,
103 MINN. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2018) (“[F]inancial incentives at any level amount to
impermissible coercion because of the unique nature of genetics and intangible risks related
to genetic privacy.”).
74. See Wolfe, supra note 73, at 1113.
75. See Koruda, supra note 64, at 134, 147-48.
76. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The EEOC, the ADA, and Workplace Wellness
Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 81, 82 (2017).
77. See id.
78. GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TR.,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2017 ANNUAL SURVEY 198 (2017), https://www.eesipeo.com/
media/24-Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-Annual-Survey-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PC6-
XJGD].
79. Id.
80. See Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the Erosion of
Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435, 448 (2012); Steven D. Pearson & Sarah R. Lieber,
Financial Penalties for the Unhealthy? Ethical Guidelines for Holding Employees Responsible
for Their Health, 28 HEALTH AFF. 845, 846 (2009).
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such as Fitbit devices, to inform their interventions, and that these
programs might expose employees to unproven techniques and
personal risk for no purpose.81
D. Balancing Risks and Benefits
Policymakers should understand that a number of these poten-
tial risks are theoretical.82 It is important to note the uncertainty
regarding the actual magnitude of the potential harms and the
reservation that programs usually lack sufficient sophistication to
apply health information in controversial ways.83 For example, it is
unknown to what extent data confidentiality has been violated after
enrollment in programs, or whether such violations have caused
tangible harms that were felt by workers.84
Nevertheless, in order to weigh programs appropriately, policy-
makers should take these potential harms into account. This is
because even minor risks could transform wellness programs’
overall risk/benefit profile.85 Serious scientific doubts remain about
wellness programs’ effectiveness, and their likelihood of generating
any benefit for participants is not at all clear.86 Assuming a lower
benefit profile, any realization of programs’ potential risks could be
significant. A full, realistic evaluation of the risks and benefits
might reveal that wellness programs do not offer a net benefit to
individual participants.
Policymakers should hesitate to assume that wellness programs
incontrovertibly promote health and reduce medical costs, and they
should focus on implementing safeguards to preempt the possibility
of harm and to secure a greater chance of benefit for participants.
Having guardrails on these programs would help to prevent out-
comes that conflict with policymakers’ intent in other policy areas,
81. See, e.g., Ajunwa et al., supra note 54, at 766; Brown, supra note 50, at 214-15; Erica
Che, Note, Workplace Wellness Programs and the Interplay Between the ADA’s Prohibition on
Disability-Related Inquiries and Insurance Safe Harbor, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 280, 292-
93.
82. See, e.g., McIntyre et al., supra note 49, at 79.
83. See id. at 64-65, 70 (noting the “methodological shortcomings” of studies assessing
the risks and benefits of wellness programs).
84. See Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 55, at 2.
85. See Madison, supra note 72, at 2073.
86. See Koruda, supra note 64, at 144; McIntyre et al., supra note 49, at 64-65, 79-80.
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such as laws designed to protect against health insurance discrimi-
nation.87
Yet as mentioned previously, current laws were passed in a
period when wellness program risks and benefits were understood
differently.88 Policymakers wanted to give employers the flexibility
to create different programs, hoping that innovations in wellness
would appeal to employees, increase productivity, and protect the
workforce from preventable health conditions.89 As a result, extant
laws are mainly intended to encourage experimentation in diverse
ways of promoting well-being,90 and they currently offer little in the
way of proscriptions to regulate a program’s scope and design.91 As
we discuss in the next Parts, the legal status quo is suboptimal, but
an opportunity exists to improve the regulation of wellness pro-
grams.
III. A LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTION FROM THE LAW
A number of federal laws currently protect employees from dis-
crimination and infringement of privacy under group health plans.92
However, these laws have exceptions for wellness programs that are
“voluntary” and “reasonably designed” to improve health.93 To
complicate the matter, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia has recently vacated administrative regulations that
provide guidance on what makes a program voluntary, and, as of
January 2019, wellness practitioners lack meaningful direction for
how to structure legal wellness programs.94 In the following Part, we
survey key statutes, regulations, and court cases on wellness pro-
grams, which together signal ambiguity in the law. In Part IV, we
propose a path forward.
87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2012).
88. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
90. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market,
71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13, 2006) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 146.121 (2018)).
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4, 300gg-53, 12112.
92. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1182; 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4, 300gg-53, 12112.
93. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4, 2000ff-1, 12112; Nondiscrimination and Wellness in Health
Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
94. AARP v. EEOC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238, 245 (D.D.C. 2017).
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A. Federal Statutes and Regulations
There are a number of relevant statutes that regulate the health
insurance and employment contexts, but they carve out exceptions
for “voluntary” and “reasonably designed” wellness programs.95 It is
worth noting that, in theory, these two criteria should help forestall
the use of programs for evading statutory goals. For example, truly
“voluntary” programs would not coerce employees into disclosing
protected health information for use in insurance eligibility or occu-
pational advancement. Similarly, programs that must be reasonably
designed to fulfill their purpose would not serve merely to reduce
health benefits based on health status. Yet, as we will illustrate, in
practice, these criteria are underdefined.
1. HIPAA and ACA: The Reasonable Design Criterion
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
prevents plans from soliciting genetic tests and prohibits discrimi-
nation in eligibility, benefits, or premiums based on a health
factor.96 Pursuant to the statute, a health factor includes one’s
health status, claims experience, medical history, genetic informa-
tion, and evidence of insurability.97 Similarly, the ACA includes
several consumer protections that enjoin health plans from dis-
crimination based on a medical condition.98 Though these laws
preclude group health plans from modifying insurance coverage
based on health status, both make exceptions. HIPAA allows health
plans to vary premiums and cost sharing in return for adherence to
wellness programs.99 Under HIPAA final regulations, programs that
tie incentives to the achievement of health targets can vary
incentives by up to 20 percent of the cost of single coverage.100 The
ACA later increased the incentive limit for these health-contingent
95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4, 2000ff-1, 12112; Nondiscrimination and Wellness in
Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).
97. Id. § 1182(a)(1).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2).
100. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market,
71 Fed. Reg. at 75,017.
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programs to 30 percent of the cost of single coverage.101 ACA
regulations allow for up to 50 percent variance if programs are
designed to mitigate tobacco use.102 Meanwhile, HIPAA and the
ACA do not restrict incentives for participatory programs.103
It is worth noting that neither HIPAA nor the ACA additionally
require programs to be voluntary. Instead, they require that health-
contingent programs be “reasonably designed to promote health or
prevent disease.”104 This standard is broad, such that a health-
contingent program is reasonably designed if it has a legitimate
chance of improving health and is not highly suspect in the methods
chosen.105 The HIPPA regulations state that “[t]here does not need
to be a scientific record that the method promotes wellness.”106 In
part, the regulations adopt this position because they were crafted
“not [to] impair such beneficial programs” that “deliver benefits well
in excess of their costs,” an assumption that we have argued should
now be treated much more skeptically.107
2. ADA and GINA: The Voluntariness Criterion
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Genetic Infor-
mation Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) permit exceptions only for
“voluntary” programs.108 The ADA provides the most comprehensive
legal protection for employees with disabilities, and it generally re-
stricts employers from conducting medical examinations or making
health inquiries.109 Meanwhile, GINA forbids both employers and
health plans from requesting or disclosing genetic information, and
101. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3).
102. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. 33,158, 33,159 (June 3, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 146.121 (2018)).
103. See JAMES, supra note 64, at 3.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B); Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health
Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B); Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health
Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
106. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market,
71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
107. Id. at 75,027.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-1(b), 12112(d)(4)(B).
109. Id. § 12112(d).
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it bars the use of genetic information in insurance underwriting or
employment decisions.110
GINA defines genetic information as involving family medical his-
tories and the genetic tests of individuals and family members.111
Broadly, then, these statutes preserve the privacy of genetic and
health information.112 However, Title I of the ADA allows employers
to conduct voluntary medical examinations and inquiries as part of
a wellness program.113 In 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) clarified that a wellness program is voluntary
if the “employer neither requires participation nor penalizes em-
ployees who do not participate.”114 Likewise, GINA authorizes
programs to collect genetic information if employees express “prior,
knowing, voluntary, and written authorization.”115 Other GINA
standards establish that the genetic information may not be dis-
closed to employers except in “aggregate terms,” and the exempt
programs must dispense “health or genetic services.”116 In 2010, the
EEOC echoed ADA regulations by defining voluntary as neither re-
quiring that employees provide genetic information nor penalizing
those who do not provide it.117
3. Regulatory Confusion
The ADA and GINA create a “voluntary” criterion for programs
with health screenings, whereas HIPAA and the ACA create incen-
tive caps and a “reasonably designed” criterion for health-contingent
programs.118 As a first point, it is important to note that in setting
different criteria, these statutes create uneven coverage across the
110. Id. §§ 300gg-53(e), 2000ff-1(b).
111. Id. § 2000ff(4) (2012).
112. See id. §§ 300gg-53, 2000ff-1(b), 12112.
113. Id. § 12112(4)(B).
114. Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC (July 27, 2000), https://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html [https://perma.cc/SZE2-ZAP9].
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(2)(B), (5)(B).
116. Id. § 2000ff-1(b)(2)(A), (5)(E).
117. Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed.
Reg. 68,912, 68,935 (Nov. 9, 2010) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8 (2018)).
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4(j)(3)(B), 2000ff-1(b), 12112(d)(4)(B); Nondiscrimination and
Wellness in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13,
2006).
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heterogeneity of programs.119 In this context, wellness practitioners
have faced uncertainty about how to bridge the provisions into a
single intelligible wellness policy.
In particular, they have expressed conceptual confusion about the
voluntariness mandate.120 This is unsurprising given that the fed-
eral laws and regulations governing wellness programs are complex
and underdeveloped. In 2016, the EEOC amended its ADA and
GINA regulations to revisit the meaning of voluntary.121 Before
then, wellness programs with health screenings could not finan-
cially penalize employees.122 However, the new regulations extended
the ACA’s 30 percent incentive limit and “reasonably designed”
criterion to all programs with health screenings.123 As such, em-
ployees could now be penalized by up to 30 percent of the cost of
single coverage for declining medical examinations. The EEOC had
revised its definition of voluntary, arguing that incentives or
penalties within the 30 percent threshold would not be “so substan-
tial as to be coercive.”124 Yet in 2017 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia vacated this 30 percent threshold, reasoning it
may not be sufficiently voluntary.125 The EEOC subsequently de-
clined to issue new guidance, while the challenged portion of the old
119. See Brown, supra note 50, at 229.
120. They have also doubted whether the ADA covers all wellness programs. See Brown,
supra note 50, at 207-08. In pertinent part, Title V of the ADA states that an insurance
provider may underwrite, classify, or administer health risks, allowing insurers to evade other
components of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). Critically, a program falling within Title
V is unmoored from the ADA’s voluntary mandate. See Grant P.H. Shuman, Escaping the
Purpose of the ADA: The “Safe Harbor” Provision and Disability-Based Distinctions in
Insurance Policies and Programs, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 549, 562-67 (2001). Though a number of
courts have examined this issue with mixed results, the EEOC has maintained that Title V
does not apply to wellness programs. See EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 855
(W.D. Wis. 2015); EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l, CIV 14-4517 ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 5795481, at *5
(D. Minn. Nov. 6, 2014); Seff v. Broward County, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373-75 (S.D. Fla.
2011), aff ’d, 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012). Since the EEOC’s interpretation has held up so
far, we do not discuss Title V extensively in this paper.
121. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,143, 31,158-59 (May 17,
2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1635.9, 1630.14 (2018)).
122. See Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,130.
123. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14.
124. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,133.
125. See AARP v. EEOC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238, 244-45 (D.D.C. 2017).
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guidance lapsed in January 2019.126 For now, wellness practitioners
have been left without a clear definition of a voluntary program.
At present, reasonably designed wellness programs can vary
incentives on the basis of health outcomes by 30 percent of the cost
of single coverage.127 Wellness programs can also receive genetic and
health information, provided the programs are voluntary (although
what voluntariness means in this context remains a mystery).128
Though administrative agencies and courts have been called on to
clarify these standards, the law remains vague.
B. Judicial Treatment
Currently, an animating legal issue centers on the definition of
voluntariness under the ADA and GINA. In this Section, we review
judicial opinions that analyze the elements necessary to render a
wellness program voluntary.129 To date, only two courts have dealt
with this issue directly. As a result, there is no broad judicial con-
sensus about how best to characterize a voluntary wellness
program.
The Wisconsin case EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc. presents
the strictest definition of voluntariness in the body of wellness
law.130 In 2009, Orion initiated a wellness program with three
components.131 First, nonsmoking employees avoided an eighty
dollar surcharge per month.132 Second, employees who exercised on
Orion’s motion machines avoided a fifty dollar surcharge per
month.133 Third, employees who completed a health screen paid no
insurance premium.134 The screen consisted of a health history
126. See Jonathan E. O’Connell, EEOC Wellness Regulations Vacated Effective Jan. 1,
2019, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesand
tools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/court-report-eeoc-wellness-regulations-
vacated.aspx [https://perma.cc/NS9G-WDA4].
127. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
129. The wellness litigation has largely focused on Title V of the ADA and on the voluntary
mandate.
130. 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1000-01 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
131. Id. at 992.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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questionnaire, blood pressure check, weight and body circumference
measure, and blood draw.135 Employees who did not contribute this
data paid the entire monthly premium, which was $413.43 for single
coverage and $1130.83 for family coverage.136 In response, the EEOC
filed suit, alleging that the program was involuntary under the
ADA.137 The agency felt that the premium cost exceeded the level of
a mere incentive.138 Orion, on the other hand, maintained that
employees had a choice regarding whether to participate.139
Critically, certain aspects of the 2016 regulations were not
retroactive, meaning the 30 percent incentive restriction did not yet
apply to Orion.140 As a result, the district court had to devise its own
interpretation of the ADA’s voluntariness criterion.
Ultimately, it held that “even a strong incentive is still no more
than an incentive; it is not compulsion. Orion’s wellness initiative
is voluntary in the sense that it is optional.”141 According to the
court, an employee under Orion’s program could still make volun-
tary choices, despite having to balance other considerations: such a
“choice may [be] difficult, but [it] is a choice nonetheless.”142
Essentially, the court reasoned, “[A] hard choice is not the same as
no choice.”143 The court thus favored a narrow reading of the ADA’s
voluntariness mandate, which was held not to forestall sizable
incentives.
The court in AARP v. EEOC took a different approach.144 In 2016,
AARP filed suit challenging the EEOC’s new regulations.145 AARP’s
principal complaint was that a 30 percent incentive level is coercive
and therefore discordant with the ADA and GINA.146 In its decision,
the D.C. District Court adopted a wider reading of the voluntariness
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 991.
138. Id. at 992.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1000-01.
141. Id. at 1001.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) (internal
quotations omitted)).
144. 292 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D.D.C. 2017).
145. Id. at 240.
146. See id.
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mandate. The court argued that the EEOC had neglected to supply
any concrete data, studies, or analysis marking the 30 percent value
as the threshold of voluntariness, and that the agency had been
unresponsive to statutory and other concerns with the regula-
tions.147 As a result, the court reasoned that employees “could be
pressured by their employers to give up private medical data as long
as the current Rules remain in place.”148 In other words, the court’s
position was that an incentive can make wellness programs in-
voluntary, and that the EEOC must therefore affirmatively defend
the voluntariness of its particular incentive level. As mentioned
above, the D.C. District Court ultimately vacated the disputed
component of the regulations.149
In short, the EEOC and district courts disagree with respect to
the meaning of voluntary. The EEOC has stated that limitations on
incentives are necessary to ensure voluntariness.150 Initially, the
agency suggested that a voluntary program could not financially
penalize employees for nonparticipation.151 Later, it claimed that a
30 percent incentive level was the threshold beyond which a pro-
gram is coercive.152 Whereas the D.C. District Court has doubted
whether this 30 percent value is adequately voluntary,153 a Wiscon-
sin district court has held that even stronger financial incentives
still qualify.154 As a result, wellness practitioners lack judicial and
regulatory guidance on whether any particular wellness program
design is appropriate. More robust definitions of the reasonable
design and voluntariness criteria are needed.
The most likely candidate to next offer an interpretation of
voluntariness is the U.S. District Court of Connecticut. On July 16,
2019, “[t]he AARP Foundation and a New Haven law firm ... filed a
class action lawsuit against Yale University” on behalf of “about
5,000 clerical, technical, cafeteria, maintenance and service union
147. Id. at 243.
148. Id. at 244.
149. Id. at 245.
150. See Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126,
31,132 (May 17, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (2018)).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 31,133.
153. AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 244.
154. EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
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workers” challenging “how the college implements its wellness
program.”155 According to the filed complaint, Yale’s wellness pro-
gram collects insurance claims data and requires participants to
complete preventative health screenings and medical tests such as
“mammograms, colonoscopies, and blood testing”; employees who
opt out of the wellness program have an annual total of $1300
deducted from their paychecks in $25 increments, which is “equiva-
lent to nearly five and a half weeks’ worth of food, four months of
utility costs, nearly a month’s worth of housing, or a month’s worth
of childcare” for the employees.156 Named plaintiff Lisa Kwesell
earns approximately $25,600 per year and is participating in the
program to avoid the fee.157 Another employee made a statement
that he would prefer not to participate but “can’t throw away
twenty-five dollars [per week] to keep [his] information private.”158
The main remedy that the employees are seeking is an end to the
program, as well as compensatory and noncompensatory damages.159
This case will portend what type of judicial interpretation of vol-
untariness is likely to endure, between the narrow interpretation
adopted in Wisconsin and the broad interpretation adopted in D.C.
With this in mind, we now turn to the question of how to define
voluntariness and reasonable design.
IV. A CONCEPTUAL PATH FORWARD
The courts have provided no workable principle to identify which
incentives are voluntary, though some commentators have offered
examples of incentives that might clearly be involuntary.160 There
is also no clear basis on which to establish a threshold for reason-
able design, as the courts have neglected this issue entirely. In this
Part, we aim to provide an analysis of these concepts. Rather than
155. Nicole Leonard, Union Workers File Civil Action Lawsuit Against Yale Over Employee
Wellness Program, WNPR (July 18, 2019), https://www.wnpr.org/post/union-workers-file-civil-
action-lawsuit-against-yale-over-employee-wellness-program [https://perma.cc/U9RQ-R8M9].
156. Complaint at 2, 10, Kwesell v. Yale Univ., No. 3:19-cv-01098 (D. Conn. July 16, 2019).
157. Id. at 3, 19.
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id. at 28-29.
160. Others have advocated for a zero-incentive rule. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 63, at 225-
26; see also Wolfe, supra note 73, at 1109-10; infra Part IV.A.2.a.
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provide specific regulatory recommendations, our goal is to develop
a practical framework for the courts and regulators to apply. The
legal landscape has been unsatisfyingly nebulous thus far, but we
believe the philosophical literature can ground a more principled
discussion that can inform policymakers in crafting useful regula-
tory definitions of voluntariness and reasonable design.
A. Voluntariness
The voluntariness requirement reflects a concern for individual
autonomy and for the authority of individuals to consent to other-
wise illegitimate actions. At the outset, then, it will be helpful to
explain what we mean by the terms “autonomy” and “consent.”
People have autonomy rights (i.e., rights for self-governance) that
correlate with the duties of others not to interfere.161 By giving
consent, a person can permit actions that would otherwise violate
her autonomy rights, “such as allowing a dentist to pull an infected
tooth or authorizing a broker to sell [some] shares.”162 Consent is
therefore morally and legally transformative—the permissibility of
certain actions hinges on whether consent has been proffered.
The moral and legal significance of voluntariness is that it bears
on consent. The general consensus is that consent to an action that
is given involuntarily is not a valid form of consent and, therefore,
that actions proceeding from such consent violate a person’s
rights.163 However, the exact meaning and scope of voluntariness in
this context is mysterious.
In the philosophical literature on consent, the term “voluntari-
ness” is frequently defined in opposition to coercion, duress, and
control. Paul Appelbaum and his collaborators state, for instance,
that “a decision is presumed ... voluntary if no evidence exists that
someone else has unduly influenced it or coerced the person decid-
ing,” whereas a decision is involuntary “only if it is subject to a
particular type of influence that is external, intentional, illegitimate,
161. Joseph Millum & Danielle Bromwich, Understanding, Communication, and Consent,
5 ERGO 45, 46 (2018).
162. Id. 
163. See, e.g., id.
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and causally linked to the choice of the research subject.”164
Similarly, the Nuremberg Code states that a decision is voluntary
when individuals are “so situated as to be able to exercise free power
of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion.”165
This would explain why bioethicists customarily think that
voluntariness is necessary but not sufficient for a person to consent
to an action—the person must also be competent to consent to the
action, details about the action must be disclosed to the person, and
the disclosure must be understood by the person.166 Each of these
conditions (i.e., voluntariness, competence, disclosure, and under-
standing) are independently important to the validity of the person’s
consent. A proponent of this view might think that voluntary deci-
sions and informed decisions, however conceived, can come apart:
for example, that a person can make a voluntary decision that is
poorly informed, as in the case of a patient who neglects to read her
consent form; and a person can be well informed about an action but
be deprived of making a voluntary decision about it, as in the case
of a patient who is involuntarily committed to a hospital for psychi-
atric evaluation.
However, some philosophers take voluntary decisions and
informed decisions as going hand in hand. Joel Feinberg, for
instance, defined voluntariness “in terms of the absence of psycho-
logical compulsion, the presence of adequate knowledge, and the
absence of external constraints.”167 John Hyman states that “an act
is voluntary if it is due to choice as opposed to ignorance or compul-
sion,” on the presumption that voluntariness is a normative concept
and ignorance and compulsion are both “exculpations, [or] factors
which excuse someone from blame.”168 According to these scholars,
164. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Conceptual Model,
39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 32-33 (2009).
165. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 181 (1949).
166. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 79
(5th ed. 2001).
167. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
257 (1986).
168. JOHN HYMAN, ACTION, KNOWLEDGE, AND WILL 5, 7 (2015).
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informed decisions are derivative of voluntary decisions. As a result,
a person cannot actually make a voluntary decision that is poorly
informed.
In other treatments, voluntariness is defined still more broadly
as “an individual's ability to act in accordance with one's authentic
sense of what is good, right, and best in light of one's situation,
values, and prior history,” in which case “[d]eliberateness, purpose-
fulness of intent, clarity, genuineness, and coherence with one’s
prior life decisions” are all implicit requirements of voluntary
actions.169 A proponent of this view might think that a person who
has a “habit-induced desire to smoke,” but who simultaneously has
a higher-order desire not to smoke, does not ultimately smoke
voluntarily.170 Were we to adopt this analysis, voluntariness would
be both necessary and sufficient for a person to provide consent to
an action.
Thus, the challenge to define voluntariness becomes that of set-
ting its scope—if voluntary decisions are just decisions that are not
controlled or coerced, then consent given voluntarily would be a
shallow form of consent. Much would remain in order for a person’s
decisions to conform to her actual will, like that she not be com-
pletely ignorant of what she is agreeing to. If, however, voluntary
decisions must satisfy additional criteria (e.g., the person received
disclosure, has understanding, acts with intentionality and
authenticity), then this prompts the question of what precise legal
duties are specified by a voluntariness requirement. Presumably,
the law would not require a person to understand everything about
what she is agreeing to, as it is normally impossible to know all the
true facts about a proposed action. And it would be overly demand-
ing for the law to require that a person faithfully heed her higher-
order reflective preferences.
So what we need is a legal rule that is broad enough to protect
individual autonomy, which is the function and moral justification
of the voluntariness requirement, but also narrow enough to allow
the courts to hold people responsible for decisions for which they
should be held responsible. To this end, we propose a two-part test
169. Laura Weiss Roberts, Informed Consent and the Capacity for Voluntarism, 159 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 705, 705, 707 (2002).
170. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 167, at 264.
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for voluntariness: (1) the employee has received adequate informa-
tion, and (2) the employee is free from coercive influences by his or
her employer(s). Before we apply this test to wellness programs, it
is important to note that this test does not exhaust the elements of
voluntariness. For example, we assume that the employee must also
be competent to make her own decisions. However, we set these
other elements aside because most employees already satisfy them,
and because the goal of this test is to delimit the substantive duties
of employers to their employees.
1. Adequate Information
There are additional, independently plausible grounds for as-
suming that the voluntariness requirement involves some element
of information disclosure. For example, GINA’s construction of the
voluntariness requirement explicitly states that employees must
provide prior, knowing, and written permission to participate in a
wellness program.171 And ADA regulations state that for a wellness
program to be deemed voluntary, employers must provide a notice
“in language reasonably likely to be understood by the employee[s]
... that clearly explains what medical information will be obtained,
how the medical information will be used, who will receive the med-
ical information, the restrictions on its disclosure, and the methods
[the employer will use] to prevent improper disclosure.”172 Moreover,
requiring information disclosure is consistent with other areas of
the law. In contract law, for example, a contract cannot be formed
if misrepresentation or nondisclosure induces a party to neither
know nor have a reasonable opportunity to know the essential terms
of the proposed contract.173 And the contract is voidable if the mis-
representation or nondisclosure is material, meaning that it would
likely induce a reasonable person to manifest her assent to the con-
tract.174 This creates a legal obligation of disclosure. Thus, we pre-
sume, the voluntariness requirement confers a duty on employers
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(2)(B) (2012).
172. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,134
(May 17, 2016).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
174. See id.
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to disclose adequate information to employees about a wellness pro-
gram in order to ensure that employees are able to exercise mean-
ingful choice regarding whether to participate.
According to our interpretation of the voluntariness requirement,
therefore, being informed about a wellness program is hashed out
in terms of employers’ disclosure instead of employees’ understand-
ing. We adopt this approach for a number of reasons. First, this
approach is reflected in the legal doctrine of contracts, consumer
protection, and consent to medical treatment, where understanding
requirements are minimal.175 Second, this approach avoids the need
to find a reliable means of assessing understanding. And third,
applying a disclosure test rather than an understanding test to
wellness programs would be attractive for lawsuits seeking in-
junctive relief rather than individual damages, which we anticipate
will be the major remedy sought.176 As a result, once the employer
has disclosed the relevant information in terms that are conspicu-
ous, readily understandable, and designed to call attention to the
significance of the information disclosed, we assume that the first
part of our test has been satisfied.
With respect to the content and scope of what is disclosed to
employees, we favor a reasonable person standard,177 which entails
the disclosure of information that would be material to a reasonable
person’s deliberation about whether or not to participate in a
175. In Canterbury v. Spence, for example, the D.C. Court of Appeals argued with respect
to medical treatment that:
In duty-to-disclose cases, the focus of attention is more properly upon the nature
and content of the physician’s divulgence than the patient’s understanding or
consent.... [T]he physician discharges the duty when he makes a reasonable
effort to convey sufficient information although the patient, without fault of the
physician, may not fully grasp it.
464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen,
Disclosure as a Consumer Protection, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT
109, 109 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (arguing that the main thrust
of consumer protection laws is the mandatory disclosure of information to consumers in
specified formats at required times).
176. Whereas a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief would have to show only that the employer
did not disclose relevant information, a lawsuit seeking individual damages would have to
show both that the employer did not disclose relevant information and that the information
would have been material to the plaintiff ’s decision regarding whether to participate in the
wellness program, which could require some assessment of the plaintiff ’s individual level of
understanding.
177. Also known as an “objective” standard.
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wellness program.178 A subjective standard, by contrast, requires the
disclosure of information that would be material to a particular
person’s deliberation. We oppose a subjective standard because it
would impose “an unfair legal burden on [employers] to intuit the
idiosyncratic ... interests of [each employee], and then leaves [them]
at the mercy of their [employees’] self-serving hindsight in court.”179
Presumably, a reasonable person standard would entail the dis-
closure of a wellness program’s specific aims, methods, anticipated
risks, benefits, and the supporting evidence; the use and sharing of
program data; and the rights of employees under federal law,
including their right to bring action against unlawful wellness
programs. It is additionally reasonable to require that employees’
assent be recorded through a signature on the disclosure, either
electronically or in paper form, in order to ensure that employers
have made a reasonable effort to present the disclosure in a
conspicuous and direct manner. This would preclude the current
practice of burying important details about wellness programs on a
website.
2. Noncoercion
Recall from above that coercion, duress, and control are usually
thought inimical to voluntariness. In fact, for legal purposes, a
decision is often presumed to be voluntary unless there is explicit
evidence that it has been coerced, as is reflected in contract and
criminal law (e.g., presumptive acceptance of the legitimacy of con-
fessions).180 It seems uncontroversial, then, to suggest that the
178. This approach is consistent with the legal doctrine of informed consent, in which
physicians have a duty to reasonably inform ailing patients about the available treatment
alternatives and the risks incidental to them. In Nixdorf v. Hicken, the Utah Supreme Court
argued that physicians have a duty to disclose any material information concerning the
patient’s condition, where materiality is defined as the following: “If a reasonable person in
the position of the plaintiff would consider the information important in choosing a course of
treatment then the information is material and disclosure required.” 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah
1980). Other appellate decisions have established a reasonable person standard for medical
treatment, including Canterbury v. Spence in Washington D.C., Cobbs v. Grant in California,
and Wilkinson v. Vesey in Rhode Island. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787; Cobbs v. Grant, 502
P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972).
179. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 167, at 33.
180. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 164, at 32.
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voluntariness requirement requires that a person must be substan-
tially free from controlling influences by his or her employer(s).
However, this leaves questions about the nature of controlling
influences and about the degree of control that must be exerted by
an employer to render an employee’s decision involuntary.
Before we continue, it will be helpful to distinguish between (1)
internal reasoning deficiencies such as confusion, fear, or unreason-
able hope and (2) external factors such as control, duress, and
coercion.181 Although both internal and external factors can com-
promise the validity of consent and the ability to act autonomously,
cognitive errors and distorted reasoning undermine a person’s
competence to consent, whereas external constraints undermine
the degree of control a person has over the choice to consent.182 This
distinction is exemplified in a U.S. Supreme Court decision that
concluded that a defendant’s hallucinations could not have coerced
him into a confession because his mental condition was by itself and
apart from any external coercive pressures.183 In this Section, our
purpose is to characterize these kinds of external factors. For
analytical simplicity, we assume that employees are competent to
consent to the program and have already received adequate infor-
mation about the program.
It is generally accepted that an action that is controlled to a sig-
nificant degree by another person is not voluntary.184 To illustrate,
consider the standard case of coercion. A gunman says to a pedes-
trian, “Your money or your life!” Typically, it is assumed that the
pedestrian does not give up her wallet voluntarily, even though it is
literally false that she has no choice in the matter.185 Taken
181. See Alan Wertheimer, Voluntary Consent: Why a Value-Neutral Concept Won’t Work,
37 J. MED. & PHIL. 226, 227 (2012).
182. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 164, at 33.
183. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); see also Appelbaum et al., supra note
164, at 33.
184. There are, however, some notable exceptions. Alan Wertheimer, for example, would
deny that it is the degree of control exerted by another person that explains when an action
is not voluntary. Instead, he maintains, voluntariness is explained in terms of the moral
legitimacy of the control exerted by another person and the availability of reasonable alter-
native actions. On the whole, though, he would agree that actions that are controlled to a
significant degree by others are often not voluntary. See generally Wertheimer, supra note
181. We discuss this view in more detail below.
185. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 8-9 (1987).
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literally, the pedestrian has been confronted with a set of unwanted
alternatives, either turning over her wallet or getting shot, and she
is able to make a rational decision between them; she decides that
turning over her wallet is the most attractive option under the cir-
cumstances.186 Yet it is a clear mistake to view her decision as
voluntary in any relevant sense.
In this context, some philosophers have argued that voluntariness
admits of degrees. As Edmund Wall puts it, “[v]oluntariness is the
degree of control that an agent has over his behavior,” ranging from
total control to total noncontrol.187 On this type of view, a person’s
actions can be controlled by another person to a greater or lesser
extent. For instance, many think that the threat of a financial
penalty for not participating in a wellness program can compromise
the voluntariness of an employee’s consent. However, financial
penalties rest on a continuum (e.g., $20,000 sanctions versus $2
sanctions), and, as a result, some financial penalties would be more
controlling than others. The mere presence of a financial penalty is,
therefore, not sufficient to ground a claim that an employee’s
decision is involuntary in a way that renders the decision invalid.
Some financial penalties would have a trivial impact on the em-
ployee’s decision and would be entirely compatible with valid
consent.188
186. See id. at 10.
187. Edmund Wall, Voluntary Action, 28 PHILOSOPHIA 127, 130 (2001) (emphasis added);
see also Robert M. Nelson et al., The Concept of Voluntary Consent, 11 AM. J. BIOETHICS 6, 10-
11 (2011).
188. Because an employee who has not met wellness program benchmarks could have
compensation that is less than a similarly situated worker who has met the benchmarks,
some might argue that wellness should be thought of as a job requirement. From this
perspective, any wellness program with financial incentives would be involuntary. We believe
this interpretation is deeply confused. The question is not whether the employee’s choice
situation was set up by the employee herself; it is obviously true that an employee who is
presented with a choice between two alternatives will eventually have to experience the
(potentially undesirable) consequences of one of the alternatives, whether she picked the
menu of potential consequences or not. Voluntariness has nothing to do with whether an
employee welcomes that she must make a choice. Rather, it has to do with whether an
employee is able to exercise meaningful choice between alternatives, once presented. Can an
employee meaningfully decide between earning $30,000 without the wellness program and
earning $30,001 with the wellness program? What about $29,000 versus $31,000? Or $28,000
versus $32,000? Answering these questions is the task at hand. Against this backdrop, the
claim that a wellness program is involuntary because of the mere presence of financial
inducements is circular; no actual argument has been made to suggest that the financial
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Thus, we must set a cutoff point for the degree of control an
employer must exert over an employee to defeat the voluntariness
of her choice. Robert Nelson and his colleagues correctly note that
there is some ambiguity involved in establishing such a threshold.189
For instance, one account might establish a low threshold for
control, such that any external pressure on an employee would
negate the voluntariness of her decision. However, this account
would classify many decisions that are usually thought to be
voluntary as involuntary, including, for example, the decision not to
buy a soda because of a small soda tax. On the other hand, an
account might establish a high threshold for control, thus classifying
many decisions that are usually thought to be involuntary as
voluntary, such as the decision not to get a divorce in response to a
threat of severe financial deprivation. The challenge, in short, is to
establish a threshold that will protect an employee’s autonomy from
wellness interventions to which she does not genuinely agree,
without ruling out the possibility that she can genuinely agree to
wellness interventions that offer mild financial incentives.
Of course, there are compelling policy reasons to set the threshold
at a particular level. For example, the most conservative course of
action would be to deny employers the opportunity to leverage
financial incentives at all. This would no doubt protect employees
from autonomy violations. And courts and regulators may wish to
reduce litigation and so adopt a rule that is unambiguous and leaves
little room for dispute. As discussed above, the evidence of the risks
and benefits of wellness programs do not necessarily supply good
reasons to allow financial incentives anyway; the evidence is thin
and the overall risks are uncertain, failing to justify any significant
support for incentives based on the protection of employee health.190
From a policy perspective, this approach would be perfectly sensible
and is one we would support. Nevertheless, we also think it is pos-
sible to establish a threshold that is more philosophically grounded,
more concordant with other areas of law and that, if adopted, would
not be overly burdensome to enforce.
incentive, no matter how small, would transform an otherwise voluntary choice to participate
in a wellness program into an involuntary one.
189. Robert M. Nelson et al., supra note 187, at 11.
190. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text; supra Part II.
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In general, the law regards a particular type of controlling
influence as defeating the voluntariness of a choice: coercion.191
Other types of influences—including a person’s preexisting prefer-
ences and values, her background circumstances, such as poverty
or illness, the presence of broad social pressures and community
norms, the use of persuasion and appeals to shared values, and even
certain forms of inducements—do not negate voluntariness.192 In
fact, it is difficult to imagine a choice that would be wholly free from
these types of controlling influences. People are constantly con-
fronted with influences that are meant to change their behavior,
such as store sales, salary bonuses, and scholarships; employers
even make offers of payment for people to assume substantial risks
of occupational injury, as in the case of “[p]olicemen, firemen, gar-
bage collectors, construction workers, [and] miners.”193 Nevertheless,
the law does not regard the choices that result as involuntary.194
Instead, the dominant position in the law (and in philosophy) is that
it is coercion, specifically, that compromises the voluntariness of a
choice.195 We therefore draw the line at coercion.196
191. See Wertheimer, supra note 181, at 230.
192. See id. at 226-29.
193. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Undue Inducement: Nonsense on Stilts?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 9, 9-
10 (2005). Jeffrie Murphy also argues that coercion negates voluntariness in a way that other
pressures do not. He writes:
The fact that I am driven to ask a friend for a loan by the threat of financial
disaster ... does not free me from an obligation to keep my promise to repay the
loan at a reasonable rate of interest. That the disaster is not my fault (was
neither chosen by me nor resulted from any negligence on my part) does not
seem the least bit relevant to the matter.... Family ties and cultural ties ... play
a large part in my decision to send my children to a good college for an
education. Does this fact in the slightest provide me with either an excuse or a
justification for not paying a tuition bill that I have contracted to pay? Surely
not.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 83-84 (1981).
194. See Emanuel, supra note 193, at 9-11.
195. See Louis C. Charland, Decision-Making Capacity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 3
(2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/decision-capacity/ [https://perma.
cc/L3L8-Y964].
196. The upshot is that even though situational constraints such as poverty and workplace
culture can have a profound effect on an employee’s decisions, none of these constraints
necessarily means that her decisions are involuntary in a way that renders them invalid.
However, situational constraints could make it easier for employers to engage in coercion and
to cover it up. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 164, at 33.
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What is coercion? There is no single account of coercion that is
endorsed across the philosophical literature.197 Historically, philoso-
phers have generally understood coercion as occurring when one
person exerts power for the purpose of gaining advantage over an-
other person, dominating the will of the other person, and punishing
their noncompliance with demands.198 The Belmont Report, mean-
while, treats coercion as a general term for almost any kind of
threat to make someone worse off: “Coercion occurs when an overt
threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person to another
to obtain compliance.”199 In ordinary language, coercion is often used
in a broad sense to refer to any kind of intrinsically wrongful social
pressure or “interpersonal infringement” of rights.200 Loosely
speaking, however, there are two types of philosophical views on
coercion.201
The first maintains that coercion is fundamentally “moralized”
(i.e., that coercion is connected to a moral judgment).202 On this
view, the claim that a wellness program is coercive would have to
include reference to the moral legitimacy of the employer’s actions.
The second view maintains that coercion is fundamentally “value-
neutral.”203 On this view, whether a wellness program is coercive
has to do with empirical or value-neutral features of the employee’s
situation, and the moral legitimacy of the employer’s actions is
treated as a separate matter. Although both views of coercion have
support in the philosophical literature, the moralized view has
197. See Scott Anderson, Coercion, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 1-2 (2017), https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/coercion/ [https://perma.cc/BST3-8WW8].
198. Id. at 3.
199. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 14 (1978).
200. Anderson, supra note 197, at 2.
201. See Wertheimer, supra note 181, at 229.
202. See id.
203. See id.
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usually been reflected in the law.204 In the following Subsection,
then, we will start by exploring the moralized view of coercion.205
a. The Moralized Approach
On the moralized view of coercion, an employer coerces an em-
ployee in a way that undermines the voluntariness of her decisions
if, and only if, (1) the employer proposes to violate the employee’s
rights or not to fulfill an obligation to the employee unless she
complies with some demand, and (2) the employee has “no reason-
able alternative but to accept [the employer’s] proposal.”206 These
two conditions are each necessary and are jointly sufficient.207
Within the framework of this view, coercion is “moralized” because
the baseline condition against which the employer’s proposal is
judged is the employee’s preexisting rights.208 In other words, we
cannot determine whether an employee has been coerced without
answering the following moral question: Does the employer have the
right to make the proposal?
A consequence of this view is that coercion is morally and legally
transformative. In a “your money or your life” situation, the gun-
man has coerced the pedestrian because the gunman’s proposal to
shoot her unless she hands over her wallet violates her rights and
because she has no reasonable alternative but to comply.209 The
pedestrian’s decision is treated as invalid.210 On the other hand,
204. In fact, Alan Wertheimer developed his version of the moralized view by examining
and then abstracting general philosophical principles from the adjudication of coercion in the
law. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 185, at 10. Areas of law that have influenced the moralized
view include contracts, wills, blackmail, criminal law (e.g., coerced confessions, duress and
necessity as criminal defenses, consent to searches, plea bargaining), and torts (e.g., voluntary
assumption of risk, informed consent to medical treatment). See id. at 10-14.
205. It should be noted, however, that our analysis will not reflect all of the distinctions
and refinements that have been made by various philosophers over the years. Instead, we will
focus our attention on the most prominent formulation of the view of coercion, developed by
Alan Wertheimer. See generally id. at 171-74.
206. A. Wertheimer & F. G. Miller, Payment for Research Participation: A Coercive Offer?,
34 J. MED. ETHICS 389, 390 (2008).
207. Id.
208. See Kristin Madison, Employer Wellness Incentives, the ACA, and the ADA:
Reconciling Policy Objectives, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407, 418-21 (2015) (considering and
then abandoning this type of approach because of its complexity).
209. See Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 206, at 390.
210. See id.
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when a prosecutor proposes to take a defendant to trial unless she
pleads guilty to a lesser charge, her decision to plead guilty is
treated as both voluntary and valid.211 In plea bargaining situations,
the prosecutor has intentionally exercised a controlling influence
over the defendant, the defendant has been threatened with a harm,
and the defendant may have no reasonable alternative but to
acquiesce.212 Nonetheless, the defendant’s decision is still not
treated as coerced because the prosecutor is not proposing to violate
a right—the prosecutor’s actions are not “morally illegitimate.”213 To
the contrary, the prosecutor is actually pursuing “a more lenient
punishment than [s]he has the right to pursue.”214 A moralized view
of coercion can therefore explain when and why a controlling
influence would undermine the validity of a person’s decisions in the
eyes of the law.
To be more precise, what distinguishes coercion from other types
of controlling influences that do not negate voluntariness and are,
therefore, perfectly valid is the presence of a rights violation.215 A
proposal is coercive, in part, because it threatens to violate a per-
son’s rights and it is specifically attributable to another person.216
This does not occur, for example, when someone must act to avoid
an unacceptable eventuality, or someone must act under conditions
211. We borrow this example from Wertheimer, supra note 181, at 233.
212. See Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 206, at 390.
213. Wertheimer, supra note 181, at 233.
214. Id.
215. Robert Nozick writes, for example,
Whether a person’s actions are voluntary depends on what it is that limits his
alternatives. If facts of nature do so, the actions are voluntary. (I may volun-
tarily walk to someplace I would prefer to fly to unaided.) Other people’s actions
place limits on one’s available opportunities. Whether this makes one’s resulting
action non-voluntary depends upon whether these others had the right to act as
they did.... A person’s choice among differing degrees of unpalatable alternatives
is not rendered nonvoluntary by the fact that others voluntarily chose and acted
within their rights in a way that did not provide him with a more palatable
alternative.
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 262-64 (1974). Along similar lines, Frank
Knight writes that a robber coerces a victim “not because the character of his choice between
the alternatives presented is different from any other choice, but because we think the robber
does ‘wrong’ in making the alternatives what they are.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND
REFORM: ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 17 (1947).
216. See Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 206, at 390.
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of hard bargaining.217 When a doctor says to her patient, “Without
chemotherapy your condition is fatal,” the patient’s decision to take
chemotherapy is thought to be voluntary.218 Even though the patient
faces a difficult choice by virtue of her cancer, and she takes herself
to be “forced” by her circumstances, she is not coerced into taking
chemotherapy because the doctor has no plan to violate her rights.
Similarly, when a cafeteria tells its food supplier, “Lower your
price by 50 percent or else lose future business,” we might call their
agreement unfair but not involuntary.219 In this case, the cafeteria’s
proposal has imperiled the food supplier, and the supplier would be
irrational to decline the cafeteria’s proposal, but the supplier is not
coerced without a prior right to bargain at a certain price.220 The fact
that the food supplier is reluctant to agree to the new price ulti-
mately has no bearing on its validity. To compare the choices, if the
doctor were to charge the patient for her chemotherapy, the patient
still has not been coerced unless she is entitled to treatment free of
charge.221 In each case, there has been no proposal to disregard the
person’s rights, and, as a result, the person’s decision is regarded as
both voluntary and valid.
Despite its many advantages, the moralized view of coercion
cannot helpfully explain which wellness programs would be volun-
tary and which would not. To see this, consider an employee’s
rights.
An employee has legal rights defined by federal statutes, state
law, and standing contracts; there are specific conditions under
which it is permissible to employ her. Thus, an employer cannot ask
an employee to work for lower than minimum wage, no matter how
desperate she is for the money.222 With regard to an employee’s
rights under wellness programs, however, one might be tempted to
217. See id. at 391.
218. We have modified this example from WERTHEIMER, supra note 185, at 63-64. He
argues that “[i]llness is unfortunate, but it does not violate one’s rights.” Id. at 64. In fact, he
argues, much less powerful, illicit pressures by the doctor might compromise the volun-
tariness of informed consent whereas the prospect of death from illness does not. See id.
219. See id. at 210 (offering a similar example).
220. See Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 206, at 390, for a medical example of an
individual with a prior right to a service.
221. See Joseph Millum & Michael Garnett, How Payment for Research Participation Can
Be Coercive, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 21, 22 (2019).
222. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
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think that an employee is always potentially uninsured and thus
has no prior right to a certain level of insurance subsidy.223 In this
respect, any financial incentive associated with a wellness program
could be described as a permissible variation of an employee’s
health benefits. This is precisely the court’s reasoning in Orion:
[E]ven a strong incentive is still no more than an incentive; it is
not compulsion. Orion’s wellness initiative is voluntary in the
sense that it is optional. An employee is not required to partici-
pate in the program and is instead given a choice: either elect to
complete the [health risk assessment] as part of the [wellness]
program or pay the full amount of the health benefit premium.
A corporation is not required to fully pay for an employee’s
health insurance—indeed, it is not required to provide health
insurance at all—and it is not unlawful to give an employee a
choice regarding her health benefits provided the choices are
among lawful alternatives. There may be strong reasons to
comply with an employer’s wellness initiative, and the employee
must balance the considerations in deciding whether to partici-
pate or not. But a “hard choice is not the same as no choice.”224
The court is ambiguous as to whether financial incentives do not
compromise the voluntariness of an employee’s consent because they
happen not to violate an employee’s legal rights with respect to
health insurance in particular or because they are metaphysically
incapable of exerting an impermissible form of control on a person’s
decisions in general.225 However, the court’s implication seems to be
223. See EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
224. Id.
225. Id. If the court does mean the latter, then its conceptualization of voluntariness is
seriously flawed. In most standard cases of coercion—including “your money or your life”
situations—the person is, strictly speaking, given a choice. As Nir Eyal notes, “the option of
dying remains open in principle”: the person is not physically forced. Nir Eyal, Informed
Consent, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/
informed-consent/ [https://perma.cc/C5DP-R5PH]. Craig Carr adds, “Coercion, it is all but
universally agreed, is antithetical to freedom,” even though “situations that are generally
recognized as coercive seem to involve an element of choice.” Craig L. Carr, Coercion and
Freedom, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 59, 59 (1988). The Orion court cannot mean to imply that the
employee’s choice is voluntary because, in every case and everywhere, being offered a choice
alone is sufficient for voluntariness in the legal sense. Voluntariness does not equal the logical
possibility for an employee to choose otherwise. Rather, it has something to do with the
reasonableness of an employee’s choices or the acceptability of her alternatives.
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that no financial incentive tied to health insurance can be coercive
because an employee has no legal right to health insurance at a
certain price and because an employer has no legal obligation to
provide it. If this is correct, then virtually any wellness program
with financial incentives would be voluntary.
Still, HIPAA and the ACA also prevent employers from varying
an employee’s health benefits based on health factors.226 An em-
ployee, we may conclude, has no general right to health benefits at
a certain price, but she does have a particular right to receive health
benefits that are on a par with similarly situated employees.
This presents the following problem. Current interpretation of
HIPAA and the ACA suggests that an employer cannot vary an
employee’s health benefits relative to similarly situated employees
by more than 50 percent of the cost of single coverage under health-
contingent wellness programs.227 Yet, it would seem that employers
face no legal limit on varying health benefits under participatory
wellness programs.228 This means that a 60 percent incentive would
coerce employees under a health-contingent wellness program but
not under a participatory wellness program, all other things being
equal. If this is correct, then the moral justification for labeling an
incentive as coercive under one program but not the other is
mysterious.
Moreover, without HIPAA and the ACA’s exceptions for wellness
programs, which have broadened over time, employers would not be
allowed to vary an employee’s health benefits at all. Should the law
ante (that is, the law before these exceptions have been applied)
then be treated as the relevant baseline set of rights against which
to compare an employer’s proposal? Deciding how to establish the
appropriate baseline in this context is puzzling and could result in
morally unacceptable judgements about which decisions are treated
as valid and which are not.
Generally speaking, then, wellness programs illustrate important
problems with transposing the moralized view of coercion onto the
law. It is possible, in many cases, that a person’s legal rights will
not be motivated by moral considerations in a way that gives them
226. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4 (2012), 18001 (2012).
227. See id. § 300gg-4(j)(3).
228. See id. § 300gg-4(j)(2).
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moral force.229 Whatever the law currently says about a person’s
rights, there might still be strong, independent reasons to think that
she should not be held responsible for her decisions or that her
decisions should not be treated as valid.230
A related problem is that the moralized view can create a form of
circularity: it answers the question of which legal restrictions need
to be put in place in order to facilitate voluntariness by appealing to
what the legal restrictions already are. In this respect, a legal re-
quirement for voluntariness can end up vacuous: rather than
motivate the law, it is merely a restatement of the law.231
For these reasons, we prefer an account of coercion that has both
independent plausibility and explanatory simplicity and that can
lend itself to an acceptable public policy.
b. The Value-Neutral Approach
On a value-neutral view, an employer coerces an employee in a
way that vitiates voluntariness if, and only if, (1) the employer
intentionally threatens the employee with what a reasonable person
would view as a serious harm unless the employee complies with
some demand, and (2) a reasonable person would find the threat
irresistible and therefore comply.232 As with the moralized view,
229. See Wertheimer, supra note 181, at 231-32.
230. This problem is mentioned in Wertheimer, supra note 181, at 232.
231. See id. at 252-53. David Zimmerman additionally takes the position that a dispute
over the coerciveness of a proposal is ultimately a dispute about freedom, not moral or legal
rights. David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 123 (1981). Yet,
if coercion were an essentially moral concept, then the only real dispute could be over rights.
Id. On these grounds, Zimmerman argues that a moralized view of coercion does not link up
in the right way with the underlying idea that coercion undermines freedom. Id. In light of
this, he proposes that the coerciveness of a proposal should be “determined independently of
any prior rights.” Id. at 126. Meanwhile, J. R. Lucas points out that many people think that
“imprisonment is the paradigm form of coercion,” though a justified one. J. R. LUCAS, THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 60 (1966). To restrict coercion to a rights violation would therefore
conflict with ordinary usage of the term. Gerald Dworkin has likewise criticized the moralized
view because it cannot make sense of ordinary talk of justified coercion. Gerald B. Dworkin,
Compulsion and Moral Concepts, 78 ETHICS 227, 228, 231 (1968). For an example of this, see
JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 54 (H. L. A. Hart ed., 1970). Although we do not
necessarily endorse these arguments, we submit them as additional reasons why someone
may want to use a value-neutral view.
232. Again, we will not recount all of the variations on the value-neutral view that have
appeared throughout the literature. Instead, we will focus on the formulation that we favor,
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these two conditions are each necessary and are jointly sufficient for
coercion. However, unlike with the moralized view, the baseline
condition against which to assess an employer’s threat is the
preprogram status quo rather than the employee’s preexisting
rights.233 In other words, the baseline is what would have happened
to the employee had the employer’s threat not been made.234
There are several implications of this view. The first is that co-
ercion is fundamentally value-neutral rather than moral: whether
a person is coerced depends on the facts of her situation (i.e., what
would have happened in the normal course of events without
another person’s deliberate intervention and how would a reason-
able person respond) as opposed to the moral legitimacy of her
situation.235 As a result, for instance, when a cafeteria tells its food
supplier, “Lower your price by 50 percent or else lose future busi-
ness,” we would now call their agreement involuntary. The cafeteria
has intentionally exercised a controlling influence over the food
supplier by threatening to harm the supplier in order to solicit a
desired response, and, presumably, the threat would not be resisted
by a reasonable person. Whether the controlling influence has
violated the food supplier’s rights has nothing to do with voluntari-
ness in this case.
A second implication, then, is that coercion is no longer morally
and legally transformative. To illustrate, consider three alternatives
with regard to the food supplier case: (1) we could accept that volun-
tariness is always necessary for valid consent and treat the food
supplier’s agreement as both voluntary and valid on a moralized
which we have adapted from Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp. Faden and Beauchamp’s
original formulation of the view is subjective and, as such, it depends heavily on the
individual response of the person at whom the coercion attempt is directed, per the following
conditions: (1) person “A intentionally threatens [person] B with what A believes B will view
as a serious harm, H, in order to induce compliance” and (2) “B finds the threat of H
irresistible and therefore complies.” FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 167, at 341. We think
that a formulation that uses a reasonable person standard is advisable for policy. Our
formulation is also generally consistent with the work of Robert Nelson and his collaborators.
See Nelson et al., supra note 187, at 6-7, 9-10.
233. As Harry Frankfurt puts it, in deciding whether one person is threatening another,
“it is necessary to consider ... what would now happen but for their proposed interventions.”
Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION
63, 69 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973).
234. See id.
235. See id. at 70.
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account of coercion, (2) we could accept that voluntariness is always
necessary for valid consent and treat the food supplier’s agreement
as both involuntary and invalid on a value-neutral account of
coercion, or (3) we could reject that voluntariness is always neces-
sary for valid consent and treat the food supplier’s agreement as
involuntary but valid on a value-neutral account of coercion.236
Whereas (2) reaches an implausible conclusion about the validity of
consent because we tend to think of the food supplier’s agreement
as valid, (1) and (3) reach plausible conclusions.237 If we adopt (3),
the value-neutral approach, then coercion is no longer intrinsically
wrongful or incompatible with valid consent: it is no longer trans-
formative.
However, coercion is still prima facie, or pro tanto, wrongful. We
can still presume that coercion negates the validity of consent under
ordinary circumstances, though this presumptive effect of coercion
on validity can be outweighed.238 For example, in the food supplier
case, we may treat the supplier’s agreement as valid despite the
presence of a coercive influence because we regard coercion as com-
patible with the public interest in this specific case. (As a result, the
value-neutral view still requires moralized judgements regarding
the validity of agreements, and these judgements still depend on
whether the use of coercion is justifiable; the key difference is that
the actual definition of coercion is now independent of these moral
and legal judgements.) Nevertheless, we decline to engage in this
discussion because of its low relevance for wellness programs.
It seems fairly clear that it would not be in the public interest to
regard an employee’s consent as valid despite her subjection to
coercion. In other words, an employer’s use of coercion would not be
perceived as justifiable. And, in any case, the statutory language
ultimately requires that an employee’s consent be “voluntary,” not
“valid.”239 As we have discussed, there is virtually unanimous schol-
arly agreement that coercion negates voluntariness, at the very
least.240 As a result, a value-neutral view of coercion can be applied
236. This line of reasoning is included in Wertheimer, supra note 181, at 232-33.
237. See id.
238. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 164, at 32-33.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2012).
240. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
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to wellness programs to essentially the same effect as a moralized
view of coercion.
Third, and finally, coercion now encompasses threats of increased
negative outcomes as well as decreased positive outcomes. Because
the baseline condition for assessing threats is the normal course of
events without the proposed intervention, an employer can coerce
an employee either by threatening to introduce or increase a harm,
threatening to remove or reduce a good, or a combination thereof.241
So, if an employer would have offered an employee $30,000 of com-
pensation plus five vacation days in the normal course of events,
then a proposal to offer her $29,000 of compensation plus three
vacation days unless she participates in a wellness program would
constitute a threat.242
Whether the employer has actually coerced the employee would
depend on what a reasonable person could resist. Recall that
coercion includes any intentional threat of a real and serious harm
that would be irresistible to a reasonable person.243 In this context,
a wellness program could be coercive even though individual em-
ployees have in fact resisted the threat, provided a reasonable
person would not. And, conversely, a wellness program could fail to
be coercive even though individual employees have been over-
whelmed by the threat beyond their ability to resist, provided a
reasonable person would not. For this reason, the extent to which
employees actually resist a threat can serve as an indicator of how
a reasonable person might respond to the threat, but this would not
be conclusive. A finding of coercion does not ultimately depend on
individual employees’ powers of resistance. Instead, courts and reg-
ulators must apply a reasonable person test to determine that a
given threat is irresistible.
241. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
242. In this context, the determination of a threat is objective, meaning that it does not
depend on psychological facts about the employees. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying
text. For example, suppose that an employer has made it clear that there will be no retaliation
against an employee if the employee decides not to participate in a wellness program, but the
employee is new to the firm and is nonetheless too intimidated not to acquiesce. Maybe the
employee believes that participation is socially expected, or that it would encourage a better
relationship with her employer. According to our approach, the employer has not coerced the
employee because, following the first condition of coercion, the employer has intended no
threat of harm and a reasonable person would perceive no threat of harm.
243. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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In that case, what could a reasonable person resist? The outcome
of a reasonable person test depends on circumstantial facts about
the group of employees. To see why, suppose that two employees,
Malena and Facundo, have both declined to participate in a wellness
program and will each be penalized $25 per week as a result.
Malena is a financially comfortable, single professor who earns a
six-digit salary and has already paid off her mortgage; Facundo is
a maintenance worker who has two dependents, earns $24,000 per
year, and is already struggling to pay the monthly out-of-pocket
costs on his diabetes medication. It is clear that the $25 penalty has
a different impact on Malena and Facundo. A reasonable person in
Malena’s position could certainly resist the penalty, whereas a
reasonable person in Facundo’s position very well might not. It is
possible, in this context, that the financial penalty would affect the
voluntariness of Facundo’s consent—a reasonable person may find
it difficult to resist the penalty under his circumstances. In some
circumstances, then, a $25 penalty could be sufficient to coerce an
employee, and in other circumstances, much larger penalties would
be needed.
However, regulators should not commence the difficult, if not
impossible, task of applying a reasonable person test on a case-by-
case basis. Instead, regulators should create a policy that can be
applied broadly by taking into consideration the circumstances of
the aggregate population. For instance, the Federal Reserve’s 2018
report on the economic well-being of American households found
that a sizeable share of U.S. adults would not be able to afford an
unexpected expense of $400.244 Regulators could take this as evi-
dence that a reasonable person under ordinary circumstances would
find an annual threat of $400 irresistible and therefore set a default
upper limit on financial threats at $400 of value, for example, $400
worth of foregone compensation plus vacation days.
Meanwhile, courts have the option of taking the more painstaking
case-by-case approach, particularly for employees at the extremes.
For example, courts could raise the upper limit on threats for
individual wellness programs that cater to an exclusively high-
244. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018 2 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-
report-economic-well-being-us-households-201905.pdf [https://perma.cc/R62R-9254].
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income population, or courts could lower the limit on threats for
especially vulnerable and low-income populations. In cases such as
Kwesell v. Yale University, where the wellness program serves a
wide range of employees, including both professors such as Malena
and maintenance workers such as Facundo, the court could simply
adopt the default limit.245 The end result is that we have a view on
which some financial incentives can negate voluntariness but where
the mere presence of a financial incentive is not sufficient to negate
voluntariness, and we have established a clear mechanism to
distinguish between the two. We have therefore accomplished the
principal task set out for us.
A final substantive question that we have yet to address, though,
is whether an offer, such as a threat, can coerce.246 A similar but, as
we will see, nonidentical way of framing this question is whether
both a wellness program’s financial rewards and financial penalties
can coerce. Can an employer’s promise of increased positive out-
comes or decreased negative outcomes coerce an employee, thereby
rendering her decisions involuntary?
The answer in the philosophical literature is generally no: gen-
uine offers do not coerce.247 For example, H. J. McCloskey argues
245. Complaint at 2-3, Kwesell v. Yale Univ., No. 3:19-cv-01098 (D. Conn. July 16, 2019).
A more complicated alternative would be for the court to adopt a tiered limit based on income.
For example, professors may be subject to one limit and cafeteria and maintenance workers
to another. A court could also decide to restrict the limit based on which threats could be
resisted by a reasonable person occupying the position of the worst-off employee served by the
program.
246. Genuine offers should be contrasted with “throffers,” which are structured as follows:
“If you succumb to my demand, I will reward you, but if you do not, I will harm you.” See
Anderson, supra note 197, at 22. Throffers are straightforwardly understood as a type of
threat because the person will ultimately experience a harm unless they accede. See id.
247. For example, Bernard Gert makes the firm assertion that “not only does [an offer] not
necessarily limit freedom, it does not limit freedom at all.” Bernard Gert, Coercion and
Freedom, in COERCION 30, 36 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972); see also
Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in COERCION 16, 23 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1972). There are, of course, a few exceptions. David Zimmerman, for example,
maintains that certain offers can involve coercion, provided that one person actively prevents
another person from being in a preproposal situation that she would strongly prefer.
Zimmerman, supra note 231, at 128-29. One of the examples Zimmerman discusses is “that
of a slave-owner who beats his slave every day,” such that the normally expected course of
events is for the slave to receive a beating. Id. at 126. One day, the slave owner proposes to
“forgo the day’s beating if the slave will perform some task.” Id. Given the slave’s baseline
condition, “this proposal counts as an offer.” Id. Zimmerman suggests that this proposal
nonetheless coerces the slave because the slave owner has violated the slave’s autonomy by
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that coercion is a threat of harms to be imposed or goods to be with-
drawn as opposed to an offer of rewards to be bestowed.248 Another
way of putting it is that people normally scorn threats but welcome
offers.249 Along this line, Jennifer Hawkins and Ezekiel Emanuel
argue that coercion is a type of choice in which a person’s options
have been altered unfavorably, thereby ruling out the possibility of
coercive offers.250 As Alan Wertheimer writes:
When are proposals coercive? The intuitive answer is that
threats are coercive whereas offers are not, that threats limit
freedom, whereas offers enhance it, that one acts involuntarily
in response to a threat, whereas one voluntarily accepts an offer,
that the recipient of an offer can decline to accept it, whereas the
recipient of a threat cannot.251
Accordingly, in a “your money or your life” situation, the gunman
diminishes the pedestrian’s options, whereas an employer who at-
tracts new employees through an unexpectedly generous contract
enhances their options. The employer does not coerce the employees
into accepting the job, irrespective of whether they lack equally at-
tractive alternatives, because the employer has not threatened to
preventing him from freeing himself in the preproposal situation. See id. at 127-29. Even on
this type of view, though, an employer’s offer of a financial reward would not count as
coercive; the employer is not preventing the employee from getting the reward elsewhere.
Zimmerman concedes, “By and large, threats involve coercion and offers do not: mainly
because people do not like to be threatened whereas they do like to receive offers.” Id. at 125.
For a critique of Zimmerman, see Lawrence A. Alexander, Zimmerman on Coercive Wage
Offers, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 161-64 (1983).
248. H. J. McCloskey, Coercion: Its Nature and Significance, 18 S. J. PHIL. 335, 340 (1980).
249. Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Gandhi], 4 POL. THEORY 65, 66 (1976).
250. Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Clarifying Confusions About Coercion, 35
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 16, 17 (2012).
251. WERTHEIMER, supra note 185, at 204.
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make them worse off if they decline.252 We endorse this interpretation.
There is, however, one respect in which this distinction between
threats and offers seems illusory. One could reconstrue a person’s
baseline condition so as to mistake an offer for a threat, and vice
versa. For example, in his helpful article, Daniel Lyons shows that
two people could have the following exchange: one person says to
another, “I will give you x if you will give me y,” and the other per-
son retorts, “In other words you are trying to force me to give up y
or else lose out on x!”253 Similarly, if we reset the pedestrian’s
baseline such that we now expect her to get shot, then we could say
that the gunman is offering to give the pedestrian her life for her
wallet. Given that we believe a threat would be coercive whereas
an offer would not, establishing an appropriate baseline is critical
for our understanding of voluntariness.
To appreciate the extent of the problem before us, consider a pair
of examples.
One company, A, decides that it would like to create a wellness
program with financial incentives for its employees. A’s employees,
who earn $30,000 per year, are told that they can enroll in a
wellness program or else incur an annual financial penalty of $2000.
Another company, B, decides that it would like to create a well-
ness program with financial incentives for its employees, who also
earn $30,000 per year. However, B’s CEO has heard that financial
penalties may soon be prohibited by law. As a result, B’s employees
are told categorically that their annual salaries will be reduced by
$2000 each, and then, months later, they are told that they can
enroll in a wellness program to recoup the funds.
Is there a meaningful difference between A’s proposal and B’s
proposal? The intuitive answer is no, given that, in either case,
the employees will receive $28,000 of compensation unless they
252. There can still be justified moral concerns over offers of rewards. For example, offers
of financial rewards may take unfair advantage of employees in vulnerable circumstances,
leading them to consent to wellness programs when they stand to assume risks but receive
no health benefits. Alternatively, rewards may predictably bring about careless or irrational
decisions that betray employees’ interests. Or rewards may create or perpetuate social
stratification based on health. These potential moral transgressions are not coercion and do
not typically involve voluntariness, although they may provide the grounds for statutory
changes to create additional protections for employees. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending
Concerns About Undue Inducement, 32 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 100, 101 (2004).
253. Daniel Lyons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, 50 PHIL. 425, 425 (1975).
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participate in a wellness program. Yet on our definition of
coercion,254 it seems that A’s proposal would almost certainly be
regarded as a coercive threat, while B’s proposal could be construed
as a mere offer. In the case of A, it is clear that an employee who
does not succumb to the proposal would be worse off than in her
baseline situation, in which she keeps her $30,000 salary. In the
case of B, it could be said that an employee who does not succumb
would be left no worse off than in her baseline situation, in which
she keeps her $28,000 salary. On the other hand, her original
$30,000 salary could be treated as the true baseline on the grounds
that she would have maintained that salary had it not been for the
employer’s intentional intervention with respect to the wellness
program.
It is in this respect that the employer’s intentions matter.
Following the first condition of coercion, both A and B have threat-
ened the employee because both A and B have intended to reduce
her compensation by $2000 unless she enrolls in the wellness
program. Since B’s motivation for the initial $2000 salary reduction
is to get her to enroll in the wellness program, and since the proper
baseline is what would have happened to her otherwise,255 we can
conclude that B has in fact threatened her. In other words, while
genuine offers can never coerce, threats that are disguised as offers
can.
It should be emphasized that financial rewards do not necessarily
equal offers, nor do financial penalties necessarily equal threats. In
the case of B, for instance, the financial reward of $2000 is actually
a disguised threat. A third company, C, may believe that employees
will respond more energetically to financial penalties, and, as a
result, C’s employees are given a $2000 bonus that they are told
they will lose if they do not enroll in a wellness program. Here, C’s
financial penalty is not actually a threat because it would restore
employees to their true baseline. But barring this unusual type of
case, financial rewards will generally correspond with offers, and
financial penalties, with threats.
To sum up, we have offered a two-part test for voluntariness. A
wellness program is voluntary if, and only if, (1) the employee has
254. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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received adequate information or, to put it differently, the employer
has disclosed information that would be material to a reasonable
person’s deliberation about whether or not to participate, and (2) the
employee is free from coercive influences by her employer. In turn,
we have offered a two-part test for coercion: a wellness program is
coercive if, and only if, (1) the employer has intentionally threatened
the employee with what a reasonable person would view as a serious
harm unless the employee accedes to the program, and (2) a reason-
able person would find the threat irresistible.
In view of this account, we have listed concrete policy recommen-
dations that would ensure minimal protections for employees
without excessively burdening employers. We have presumed that
a reasonable person standard would entail the disclosure of a
wellness program’s specific aims, methods, use and sharing of data,
anticipated risks and benefits, and any available evidence on the
aforementioned risks and benefits, as well as the employee’s rights
with respect to such a program.
Next, we have suggested that an employee’s assent should be
recorded through a signature on the disclosure, either electronically
or in paper form. And finally, we have argued that wellness pro-
grams’ financial rewards do not normally coerce, but that financial
penalties beyond $400 frequently do. Together, these policies would
shore up the legal right of employees to exercise voluntary choice
regarding whether to participate in a wellness program.
B. Reasonable Design
This brings us to the concept of reasonable design. As discussed
above, an assessment of wellness programs’ risks and benefits does
not favor a presumption that a given program is reasonably de-
signed. There are weak grounds for assuming that any given
program is effective, and prior confidence on this score was mis-
taken.256 It follows that we should have a higher evidentiary
standard for reasonable design than we do currently. In the face of
general uncertainty, there should be some reason to believe a given
program will work before awarding it a statutory exception. In
256. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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addition, in light of the concerns we have discussed, it is appropriate
for courts and regulators to err on the side of employee protection.
Therefore, there would seem to be compelling justification for
strengthening the current regulatory interpretation, which main-
tains that reasonably designed programs must not be overly burden-
some, highly suspect, or a subterfuge for violating federal law.257
A plausible direction forward would have two prongs. First, courts
and regulators should require that reasonably designed wellness
programs be closely tailored; each individual program component
must be strongly related to the wellness program’s aims. We en-
vision this as a strict requirement. It prohibits, for example, crea-
ting surveys for the purposes of general information gathering or
estimating future medical costs.258 Instead, employers may collect
only the minimum information necessary to administer specific
health interventions. In short, each wellness program component
must be well motivated and clearly stated for program participants.
Second, courts and regulators should give employers reason to
evaluate their programs or seek evidence-based practices. Though
not compulsory, this conduct could be used as evidence of reasonable
design in court, for example. Already, federal wellness programs are
required to evaluate the effectiveness of their interventions in
meeting health goals.259 Since many employers contract with third-
party vendors to deliver their wellness services, large-scale evalua-
tions of many workplace wellness programs should be feasible.260
Given that quality data regarding wellness programs has been
heretofore unavailable,261 we do not expect courts and regulators to
require that each wellness program be demonstrably effective.
Nevertheless, wellness programs that have unusual methods of
promoting health or that pose more than minimal risk to employees
should have a greater burden of showing benefit.
257. See supra Part III.A.1.
258. See CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at 199 (finding that 67 percent of firms use
information collected through wellness programs to understand employee health risks).
259. Nadia Chait & Sherry Glied, Promoting Prevention Under the Affordable Care Act, 39
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 507, 515 (2018) (explaining that the ACA mandated evaluation of
federal health and wellness initiatives and directed the CDC to survey workplace wellness
programs nationally).
260. See Mattke et al., supra note 49, at 17.
261. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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CONCLUSION
With the recent lapse in regulatory guidance,262 courts and regu-
lators have been given an opportunity to implement a new legal
approach. We believe our work can serve as a guide to courts and
regulators as they settle on a statutory interpretation.
However, the views we have endorsed need further elaboration,
particularly given some of the trade-offs that result. For example,
we have encouraged employers to evaluate their wellness programs
while also promoting policies that would make it more difficult for
them to aggregate the data needed to do so.263 As a result, it could
be harder for programs to get off the ground or experiment with new
interventions. In addition, we have tied voluntariness to employees’
circumstances,264 which may strain courts that opt to sift through
the circumstances of individual employees who are served by a
given wellness program. Undoubtedly, a $400 brightline rule on
threats would be easier to administer. Finally, we have focused on
voluntariness and reasonable design because these are the statutory
criteria that cover most programs, but the statutes could change.265
In this Article, we have not considered other criteria that could be
better suited for wellness programs, nor have we discussed the
potential advantages of revising the statutes.
Nevertheless, we believe that any inconveniences posed by our
approach are more than justified if one takes an appropriately mea-
sured view on whether wellness programs are good for employees.
On balance, we believe our work offers a concrete framework for
regulating wellness programs that would produce better outcomes
for employees as well as provide clarity for employers on how to
structure legally compliant programs.
262. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
263. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
264. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part III.A.
